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mandatory disclosure, although the voluntary disclosure level was rather limited. 
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1   Introduction 
 
This paper investigates accounting disclosure practice and its determinants for a 
sample of Egyptian non-financial companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(ESE) over the period 1995-2002.  It contributes to the disclosure literature by using a 
panel data set. Panel data sets possess a number of advantages over traditional cross-
sectional or time series data sets. They usually give the researcher a large number of 
observations, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the collinearity problem 
among explanatory variables, hence improving the efficiency of econometric 
estimates. Moreover, the use of panel data provides a means of resolving or reducing 
the magnitude of the problem of omitted variables that are correlated with explanatory 
variables [1]. Furthermore, this paper distinguishes between disclosure practice for 
public business sector companies and private sector companies, and for heavily traded 
and less traded companies. These two characteristics are country related 
characteristics and  hence improve our understanding of disclosure practice in Egypt.  
 
Although the ESE is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world, there appears to 
be virtually no comprehensive empirical international published study that covers 
disclosure practice in the Egyptian context, with the exception of the Abd-Elsalam 
and Weetman (henceforth AW) study in 2003 [2]. The purpose of the AW study was 
to investigate issues related to familiarity and language accessibility of the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) disclosures when they were first introduced 
in the Egyptian capital market, while the purpose of this study is to investigate the 
extent of disclosure and its determinants for a sample of Egyptian listed companies.  
The AW disclosure index covers mandatory disclosures, while this research 
constructs two indexes covering both types of disclosure: mandatory and voluntary 
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disclosures. The research sample in the AW study consists of 72 non-financial listed 
companies for the financial year 1995, while the sample in this study includes 77 
companies spanning the period 1995 to 2002, thus enabling a panel data analysis.  
 
The importance of this study arises from the benefits it provides to individual 
investors and regulators. The disclosure practices of the Egyptian listed non-financial 
companies may benefit individual investors when planning their investment choices in 
Egypt. Identifying variables affecting disclosure levels and shedding light upon the 
difference between public business sector companies and private sector companies 
regarding disclosure practice might help regulators in specifying ways to enhance 
disclosure and transparency in the ESE. Moreover, this study may help as a guide in 
studying other markets in the area, which may contribute to the accounting literature 
on emerging capital markets.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a background to the 
ESE. The disclosure index and its creation are explained in section 3. Section 4 
develops the research hypotheses. A description of the data, together with data 
analysis and results, are provided in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
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2    An overview of Egypt’s stock exchange and financial disclosure reporting   
 
Egypt is an Arabian, middle-eastern, and African country. These characteristics give 
this study a special importance, as the results could be applicable to a wide range of 
countries. The ESE is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world, and the first one 
to be established in the Middle East. The Alexandria Stock Exchange was officially 
established in 1888 followed by Cairo in 1903. The ESE ranked fifth in the world in 
the 1940s. Historically, the performance of the ESE has reflected the economic 
changes that have taken place in modern Egypt’s history. From this point of view, it is 
possible to identify four stages in modern Egyptian economic history: the pre-1956 
period, the period between 1956 and 1973, the period between 1974 and 1991, and 
from 1992 to the present. The pre-1956 period was characterised by the dominant role 
of the private sector and witnessed the establishment and development of the ESE. By 
the middle of the 1950s the government adopted socialist oriented policies. This 
period witnessed the development of the public sector whilst the role of the private 
sector diminished. In 1974 the government adopted the Open Door Policy, which 
encouraged foreign investment in Egypt as a way to activate and enhance the role of 
the private sector in the economy. A number of new laws were issued to encourage 
and regulate the formation of private sector companies. Among those, the issuance of 
Tax Law no. 157 and Companies Law no. 159 in 1981 contributed to the increase in 
the number of companies listed on the Stock Exchange by both obliging joint stock 
companies to be listed on the Stock Exchange and offering tax exemptions for listing 
[3, 72-76].  
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In 1990, the government started a program of economic reform and restructuring 
towards a free-market economy. The corner stone to a free-market economy was to 
adopt a privatisation program. The issuance of the public business sector companies’ 
Law 203 of 1991 was the primary step in the privatisation program. According to this 
Law, public sector institutions previously subject to Law 97 of 1983 became holding 
companies. Companies that were under the supervision of these public sector 
institutions became subsidiary companies. The privatisation program started in 1994 
when the government designated 314 public sector companies as potential candidates 
for the privatisation process. By the listing of state owned companies, the stock 
exchange witnessed the listing of two types of companies in terms of legal form: 
private sector companies and public business sector companies.  
 
Public business sector companies must comply with the Uniform Accounting System 
(UAS) of 1966. The UAS was established for national planning and control purposes. 
It requires companies to prepare some accounts that are different from the traditional 
ones. Generally, according to the UAS public business sector companies are required 
to prepare a balance sheet, a profit and loss account, a production and trading account, 
a current production account, a statement of changes in financial position, and a cash 
flow statement. Moreover, public business sector companies listed in the ESE are 
joint stock subsidiary companies; hence they are obligated to comply with the 
disclosure requirement of Company Law (CL) of 1981. According to this Law, 
companies are required to prepare a balance sheet, a profit and loss account, and a 
board of directors’ report. Furthermore, public business sector companies if listed in 
ESE have to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Capital Market Law 
(CML) 95 of 1992. According to the CML listed companies are required to comply 
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with the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EAS) issued by the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade in conformity with the International Accounting Standards (IAS) / Financial 
Reporting Accounting Standards (IFRS). In the absence of specific EAS regarding 
any accounting treatment, the IFRS must be applied [4]. However, some overlap 
between the disclosure requirements of the three regulations does exist, especially 
between the disclosure requirements of CL and CML. The disclosure requirements for 
private sector companies are organised according to the CL. However, all listed 
companies irrespective of their legal form, have to comply with the disclosure 
requirements of CML.  
 
 
3   The disclosure index 
 
The extent of accounting disclosure Marston and Shrives ( check reference list) [5] in 
the Egyptian context might not be empirically extensively researched before Abd-
Elsalam [3]. She indicated that the level of compliance with Capital Market Law 
disclosure requirements in a sample of 72 Egyptian listed companies was 79% in 
1995.  
 
Moreover, the 2002 annual report of the Capital Market Authority [6] (CMA) and the 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) - Accounting and 
Auditing - note that there are gaps between official accounting standards and actual 
practices. A review of 2001 financial statements of the 30 top-listed companies 
revealed a number of missing disclosures [7].  
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This raises a question about compliance and non-compliance costs. From a company 
point of view, compliance costs include information production and dissemination 
costs, which include training preparers on the applicable standards. Non-compliance 
costs include market pressure and administrative penalties from CMA such as 
monetary penalties and delisting. With respect to non-compliance costs, many 
investors in Egypt are small investors who cannot form a pressure group on listed 
companies, unlike their counterparts in developed markets [3]. Administrative 
penalties by CMA were introduced in August 2002. Therefore, they were not 
applicable during the time period covered by this research. This was confirmed from 
the ROSC report [8], which indicates that the lack of knowledge among preparers and 
auditors of financial statements, the unavailability of implementation guidelines on 
EAS and IFR, and the lack of authority for enforcing penalties constrain the 
preparation of financial statements in compliance with the applicable standards. 
Generally, it appears that compliance costs might have exceeded non-compliance 
costs for listed companies at least for the time period investigated here. This leads us 
to expect a departure from full compliance with mandatory disclosure, which is not 
unique to the Egyptian companies as it was also observed in other emerging markets; 
examples are Nigeria, Hong Kong, and Bangladesh [9]. 
  
Therefore, to study disclosure levels in an environment that could be characterised as 
a low informational environment, it is believed that mandatory disclosure could form 
the basis of this study.  The research method used here is a disclosure index [10]. We 
started with a list of items of information drawn from the checklist for the disclosure 
and transparency requirements of the CMA, which provides Guidelines Manuals to 
inform companies issuing financial securities and their auditors of the procedures 
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followed by the CMA to ensure their compliance with disclosure and transparency 
requirements according to the EAS that are in conformity with IFRS. 
 
A careful review of disclosure literature was undertaken to select items of information 
(not included in the checklist of the CMA) that Egyptian companies might disclose 
voluntarily.  In a situation where full compliance with mandatory disclosure is not 
expected, this was a hard task.   
 
We believe that the check list, used by the Center for International Financial Analysis 
and Research (CIFAR) [11] to evaluate corporate disclosure levels for leading 
industrial companies in a number of emerging and developed countries, was a 
reasonable one to start with. It includes some fundamental information that sometimes 
overlaps with the mandated one by CML.  Hence, we can use it as a basis for the 
potential voluntary information index in the Egyptian context. Although the CIFAR 
database goes back to the middle ninetieths, it is still being used in recent accounting, 
finance and economics literature (see for example [12]).  
 
Since, it could be argued that the list of items of information drawn from the CIFAR 
checklist are outdated or irrelevant to the Egyptian context, the list was then revised 
by checking out what companies did actually disclose. For example, while it is 
required to disclose the unpaid amount of capital, firms tend to disclose the paid 
amount of capital. Another example is deferred tax: companies tend to give notes 
about taxation and leave a note that the amount of deferred tax is not practical to 
measure. Moreover, the amended list was sent out to a sample of Egyptian 
professional users to request their views regarding the usefulness of items of 
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information included in the list. They were asked to indicate their views regarding the 
usefulness of these items of information in making investment decisions about a 
company’s common shares. A five-point scale is used, ranging from 1 (not useful) to 
5 (very useful). In results not presented here, the minimum score assigned was 2.5, 
which indicates at least a medium level of usefulness of the items of information 
included in the initial list for decision making in the Egyptian context.  
 
Then we applied the list of items of information to the sample firms and filtered it for 
non-applicable items: items that were rarely disclosed or have never been disclosed by 
the sample firms over the research period of study. We required that the item of 
information included in the list had to be disclosed at least by 20% of the sampled 
firms over the period of study to be included. This process led to the elimination of 40 
items of information from the original list (see Appendix  1). This process left us with 
a final list that includes 75 items of information with a minimum awarded usefulness 
of 3.2 from the survey. 
 
We followed the un-weighted approach in creating the two indices as this study is a 
longitudinal study and the level of importance of each item of information could have 
changed over time and among different industries. Depending on the list of items of 
information, each item of information is scored according to its existence in the 
annual reports of the sampled firms. An item scores 1 if it is disclosed and 0 if it is 
not. The total un-weighted index is calculated as the total scores awarded to a 
particular company for a particular year divided by the maximum number of 
applicable items of information. 
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Finally, assuming that low compliance with mandatory disclosure could be treated as 
voluntary disclosure, as more discretion is believed to be exercised over disclosing 
these items of information, we considered mandatory items of information disclosure 
that show volatility over time to be voluntary disclosure. To lessen subjectivity in 
doing so, we calculated the compliance ratio for each item of information included in 
the final list for the whole sample. The average score awarded to a particular item 
over the sample period measures the compliance ratio. For example, company name is 
disclosed from the whole sample so it is awarded a compliance ratio of 1 and so on. 
Figure (1) shows the compliance ratio for each item of information included in the 
final list for the whole sample.  
 
Graph 1 is about here 
 
From this Graph we notice that mandatory items of information, which are presented 
by a continuous line from 0.20 to 1, exhibit different levels of compliance. A number 
of mandatory items of information have high compliance levels. Some of them have 
low compliance levels, however, and show levels of compliance that are very similar 
to those of voluntary items of information. Hence, as shown in Graph (1) we were 
able to identify a “cut” point. It is the point at which we treat low compliance with 
mandatory disclosure as voluntary disclosure. From Graph (1) this cut point is a 
compliance ratio of 78%. Above this cut point are mandatory items of information, 
which have high compliance ratios; hence they form the mandatory disclosure index. 
Under this cut point are mandatory items, which have low compliance ratios, and 
voluntary items of information; hence they both form the voluntary disclosure index. 
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It is worth noting that the first item under the cut point is a voluntary item of 
information, which indicates that the cut point is a reasonable one.  
 
In brief, items that have a compliance ratio from 78% and above are considered to 
form the mandatory disclosure index (49 items of information), and the rest are 
voluntary disclosure (26 items of information). Hence we create the two indices: 
mandatory disclosure index and voluntary disclosure index (see Appendix  1). 
 
4   Development of hypotheses   
  
Expectations about determinants of disclosure levels depend on a review of prior 
studies. Prior studies rely on a framework of agency theory and signalling theory to 
develop their hypotheses regarding determinants of disclosure levels. Given a 
separation of ownership and control of resources in a firm, agency theory predicts 
conflicts between shareholders (principal) and managers (agent) and between 
shareholders/managers (agent) and debt-holders (principal) to take place within the 
firm if individuals act self-interestedly. Two sets of agency costs are then incurred: 
the agency cost of equity or debt and the costs of monitoring managers, so that 
managers do pursue the principal’s interest [13]. Depoers [14, 248] added ‘given that 
these costs (monitoring costs) reduce their compensation, managers have an incentive 
to keep them low. Since accounting disclosure is a means by which their activity can 
be monitored, managers are thus encouraged to disclose information voluntarily’.  
 
Signalling theory is concerned with the information asymmetry problem between 
managers of the firm and the market. Abd-Elsalam (Check this passage, reference to 
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Gujarati should be eliminated. Also add page number of this quote) [3, 28] stated that: 
‘signalling theory, in the disclosure scenario, means that managers will disclose 
information which implies that the company has a share value which is larger than 
that assessed by the market, in order to encourage an upward revision of their stock 
prices. Managers will withhold information that implies values below the assessment 
of the market. These ‘‘silent’’ companies are identified by investors as companies 
with less than average valuation and, accordingly, their shares will be re-valued 
downward. This downward price revision of non-disclosing companies will in turn 
encourage those within the group holding good news, relative to the recently 
decreased average valuation, to screen (signal) themselves out of the group by 
disclosing their information. The disclosure process thus proceeds, until the positions 
of all companies in the valuation hierarchy are identified’.  
 
Prior studies on disclosure levels have examined the relationship between a measure 
of the disclosure level and/ or quality and a number of company characteristics: 
company size, listing/cross listing, profitability, gearing, and others. While the results 
for firm size and listing/ cross listing are most often constant among prior studies, 
other variables yield mixed results.  
 
In the following section we develop hypotheses about the relationship between 
disclosure levels and firm characteristics: firm size, legal form, profitability, gearing 
and stock activity, which might affect disclosure levels in the Egyptian context.  
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4.1   Firm size 
A large number of prior studies investigate the relationship between disclosure level 
and firm size. Firm size is considered to be an important determinant of corporate 
disclosure strategy and is used as a control variable in the empirical literature on 
disclosure. Results frequently confirm a positive relationship between firm size and 
disclosure level. Prior studies provide a number of explanations of this positive effect 
of size upon disclosure level. It is argued that firm size is a comprehensive variable 
that could proxy for competitive advantages, information production costs and 
political costs [3, 43]. Firstly, information production and dissemination is a costly 
process, and larger firms might be more able to afford these expenses. Also, if the 
process of producing information includes a fixed component, the proportion of these 
fixed costs to firm size will be smaller for larger firms. Secondly, more disclosure 
might put smaller companies in a position of competitive disadvantage with their 
larger counterparts in the industry. Therefore, they might be reluctant to disclose more 
information than larger companies. Thirdly, large companies are more likely to be in 
the public eye and attract news coverage and public interest, and are more closely 
monitored by government agencies; hence they might disclose more information to 
reduce public criticism or government involvement in their affairs. Moreover, it is 
argued that the larger the company (in terms of number of shareholders), the larger 
the informational gap (information asymmetry) among investors on one hand and 
between investors and the management on the other hand, so more disclosure might 
be used to reduce the information asymmetry problem.    
While most prior studies support the hypothesis that large firms disclose more 
information than small firms, Ahmed and Nicholls [9] found a negative but not 
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significant relationship between firm size and mandatory disclosure. Moreover, AW 
found no significant association between different measures of mandatory disclosure 
(IAS) for a sample of Egyptian listed companies and firm size at the 5% level of 
significance in a univariate analysis.  As prior empirical studies in the Egyptian 
context are rare and AW could not support or dismiss a positive relationship between 
firm size and disclosure level, we will test for the general expectation regarding the 
effect of firm size. Hence we can develop the first hypothesis as follows: 
  
H1: Larger firms are expected to have higher levels of disclosure than that of smaller 
firms.  
 
Although there are a number of measures of firm size, including number of 
shareholders, shareholders’ funds, total assets, total sales, and market value of equity, 
the disclosure literature does not provide a theory or criterion to choose among 
different proxies. However, total assets and sales were the most popular measures of 
firm size in prior studies.  Therefore, we use the book value of total assets and sales 
respectively.  
 
4.2   Legal form 
 
This attribute is particularly relevant to Egyptian listed companies as they can be 
classified according to their legal form into two types: private sector companies and 
public business sector companies. Public business sector companies are state owned 
companies, which have been listed in the ESE in preparation for full privatisation.  
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Although both types of business might comply mainly with different financial 
reporting requirements according to different laws as explained in section 2, if they 
are listed in the ESE then they must comply with the Egyptian Accounting Standards 
(EAS) issued by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in conformity with the International 
Financial Reporting Accounting Standards (IFRS). In the absence of specific EAS the 
IFRS must be applied.  However, AW hypothesized that public sector companies are 
more likely to disclose more information than private sector companies and provided 
some explanations. Public business sector companies were among the largest listed 
companies, so this variable could proxy for firm size (agency theory). Also they are 
listed for privatization purposes, so because they seek finance, they may disclose 
more information (capital need theory). Moreover, public sector companies are 
subject to close observation by the government and the public, so they might disclose 
more to reduce political costs. AW found a significant positive association between 
legal form and two measures of mandatory disclosure level [15] (IAS-CA, IAS-NA), 
but no significant association was found with IAS-CML.  
 
However, if the hypothesis of the large size of public sector companies was applicable 
in 1995, we do not expect it to be applicable from 1995 to 2002, as more public sector 
companies were privatized over this period of time and some large private sector 
companies were listed after 1995. Moreover, the hypothesis of seeking finance holds 
for both private sector companies and public business sector companies in our sample, 
as both are public companies, and family companies are excluded from the research 
sample. Furthermore, the hypothesis of political costs could hold for both types of 
company as more attractive private companies, especially for small investors who 
lack experience, have entered the market particularly in the communication sector. In 
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brief, while the hypotheses of AW might hold for their sample period, they might be 
less applicable to our sample construction and period of study. From this discussion 
we do not expect a significant difference in disclosure levels between these two types 
of companies to exist. Hence, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
 
 H2: legal form does not affect levels of disclosure of listed companies. 
 
Legal form is measured using a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
company is a public sector one and zero if not. 
 
4.3   Profitability 
 
Prior studies predict that the relationship between profitability and disclosure is 
positive. Several explanations have been offered for this expectation. First, managers 
of more profitable companies are motivated to disclose more to distinguish their 
companies from less profitable ones (good news-signalling theory), in order to 
increase investors’ confidence, and to obtain personal advantages such as continuance 
of their positions and boosting their compensation. Second, according to political 
process theory more profitable companies will disclose more to justify their levels of 
profits [16]. However, signalling theory predicts that managers might choose to 
disclose bad news in a timely manner to reduce the risk of legal liability and/or loss of 
reputation [17]. It is obvious that while agency theory and political process theory 
predict a positive association between profitability and disclosure level, signalling 
theory provides justification for a negative relationship. Empirical studies also 
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provide contradictory results for example AW found positive and negative but not 
significant relationships between profitability and mandatory disclosure levels. In 
brief, both theoretical and empirical prior studies indicate the possibility of both 
positive and negative relationships. However, in the Egyptian context, it was 
suggested that investors are more interested in the profit figures [18, 19].  Assuming 
that listed companies are aware of investors’ interest, we can expect that more 
profitable companies will disclose more to increase investors’ confidence. Hence, we 
can develop our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: the higher the level of profit the company achieves, the higher the level of 
information it discloses. 
 
Profitability is measured as net income to book value of equity. 
 
4.4   Gearing  
 
Gearing is a measure of the ability of a company to meet its obligations either in terms 
of long-term debt or total debt. It is argued that the higher the gearing ratio, the higher 
the agency costs because larger gearing ratios allow for greater potential transfer of 
wealth from creditors to shareholders [14, 249]. Hence highly geared companies 
encounter more monitoring costs and have greater obligation to satisfy the 
information needs of debt-holders.  So they are likely to disclose more information 
than lowly geared companies. This in turn should reduce the monitoring costs (agency 
theory) of long-term debt-holders. Results from prior studies regarding the 
relationship between gearing and disclosure level are contradictory. Chow and Wong-
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Boren [20] found no significant effect. AW found a significant negative relationship 
between gearing and their measure of mandatory disclosure level (IAS-CML), while 
no significant association was found with their other measures of disclosure level 
(IAS-CA, IAS-NA). 
 
However, the bond market in Egypt is very small compared to other emerging and 
developed capital markets. It represents around 15.5 percent of the total market 
capitalization as of the end of June 2002. Bondholders’ associations have the right to 
inspect the financial statements and to send a representative to the annual general 
meeting. Accordingly, the main borrowing facility by the Egyptian listed companies 
is still borrowing from banks and holding companies, especially for the sample firms 
where there was no single company that has issued bonds. Given that we expect the 
number of debt-holders of a particular company to be small, they should gain easy 
access to the information they need directly from the company. Thus we do not expect 
that gearing ratio will affect disclosure level in the annual reports.  
 
The hypothesis to be tested is that: 
 
H4:  the level of information disclosed by a firm is not associated with the level of its 
gearing ratio.  
 
Gearing is measured as total debt to total assets. 
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4.5   Stock Activity 
 
Companies listed in the ESE can be classified into traded companies and rarely traded 
companies. Rarely traded companies are in most cases family companies, which are 
listed to exploit the tax exemptions applied to listed companies. AW hypothesized 
that traded companies are likely to disclose more than rarely traded companies as they 
seek finance.  AW found a significant positive association between their measure of 
stock activity and two measures of mandatory disclosure (IAS-CA, IAS-CML) but no 
significant association was found with their third measure of mandatory disclosure 
(IAS-NA) 
 
Although our sample consists of traded companies only, we can distinguish between 
heavily traded companies and less traded companies. Heavily traded companies are in 
the public eye to a greater extent with greater news coverage than less traded 
companies (political process theory), so they might disclose more information than 
less traded companies. Moreover, if the information asymmetry problem exists for 
heavily traded companies, they then might face a risk of undervaluation of their stocks 
in the market. Hence, managers of firms that perceive their firm’s share value as 
larger than that assessed by the market, are motivated to disclose more information to 
encourage an upward revision of their stock prices (signalling theory).  Hence, the 
hypothesis to be tested is:  
 
H5: heavily traded companies are more likely to disclose more information than less 
traded companies. 
 
 21 
Stock activity is measured as the ratio of the number of trading days during the six 
months prior to the financial year-end to total trading days during that period.   
 
 
5   Data analysis  
 
5.1   Data collection and sources 
 
This section describes the process of collecting the relevant data used in this research. 
The objective was to collect a complete series of annual reports in their original 
format for as many traded non-financial companies as possible over the period 1995 
to 2002 [21]. After contacting some potential sources, the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) in Egypt proved to be the most suitable source for this information.  The 
electronic archive department, which is part of the information centre, scans the 
original reports of listed companies. This process considerably facilitates the access to 
these reports for a wide range of users including researchers and investors.  
 
The final sample consists of 77 non-financial listed companies from 13 different 
industrial sectors over the period 1995 to 2002. We reached this figure after a number 
of refinements due to changes in legal status, ownership and availability of data. We 
started with 66 non-financial listed companies about which information is available. 
However, thirteen of these companies have been privatised and changed their legal 
form from public sector companies to private sector companies, and two other 
companies have merged.  It was decided to treat these fourteen companies as new 
companies once the change had taken place, thereby avoiding any overlap of data 
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from prior periods. This yielded 80 cross sections. The number of observations per 
company varies ranging from one to eight observations over the period 1995 to 2002 
[22]. Finally, three companies in the sample did not start production during the 
sample period, so that information about profitability was not available. Hence they 
were dropped from the analysis leaving 77 companies with 264 final observations 
(cross-section and time series). 
 
5.2   Preliminary descriptive analysis of the variables 
  
Table (1) provides a descriptive analysis of each variable. The average size of firms 
measured by total assets is L.E 572 million, while the average size measured by sales 
is L.E 323 million.  The sample consists of 123 public business sector observations 
and 141 private sector observations. Average profitability is 28%, and average 
gearing ratio is 58%. Companies in the sample are on average heavily traded 
companies as they were traded 82% of the possible days of trading.  
 
Table 1 is about here 
 
 
On average, listed non-financial Egyptian companies publish 90% of the list of 
mandatory information items (49 items) and 48% of the list of the voluntary 
information items (26 items). These results are similar to those obtained in the Saudi 
market [23] where the average compliance with mandatory disclosure was 0.93, but 
higher for the average of voluntary disclosure which was 0.28 in the Saudi market. As 
almost all the variables are skewed, a logarithm transformation of the variables was 
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undertaken to bring the distributions of these variables closer to normality [24]. Using 
the natural logarithm of each variable, however, the transformation was only 
successful with the book value of total assets, as can be seen from Table (1). Hence 
we use the natural logarithm of total assets rather than sales as a measure of firm size 
in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Graph (2) shows trends in the level of the different types of information disclosure 
over time. It shows an increasing rate of compliance with mandatory disclosure (Med 
Mindex). This high level of compliance confirms the compulsory nature of this list of 
information over time. However, departing from full compliance might reflect that 
compliance costs for listed companies exceeded non-compliance costs over the 
sample period. But this should change after the introduction of the new listing rules, 
which took place in August 2002, as more non-compliance costs, which vary from 
monetary penalties to delisting, are incurred. The level of voluntary disclosure (Med 
Vindex) is increasing over time apart from the decline in 1997. This particular decline 
in voluntary disclosure will be tested later on.   
 
Graph 2 is about here 
 
 
 
Since the normality hypothesis is rejected for almost all the variables except ln(assets) 
and gearing  a  nonparametric correlation test is used. The Spearman cross product 
correlation matrix is presented in Table (2).  
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Using Table (2) we can examine the correlation between different proxies of 
disclosure level and their expected determinants as well as the correlations among the 
explanatory variables to check whether there is any potential sign of multicollinearity. 
While the results confirm some statistically significant correlations among the 
explanatory variables, the magnitude of these correlation coefficients, which do not 
exceed 0.362, do not indicate a serious collinearity problem [25]. 
 
Table 2 is about here 
 
 
As a further check for multicollinearity the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
computed for each independent variable in the multiple regression model by 
regressing each explanatory variable on the rest of the explanatory variables in 
individual multiple regression models using SPSS software (results not presented 
here). The VIF does not exceed 1.1 for any explanatory variable. It is considered that 
for a particular explanatory variable collinearity is not a problem if the VIF for that 
variable is less than 5 [26, 576].  This is confirmed from the tolerance coefficients 
[27], which did not fall below 0.905 for any independent variable. We conclude that 
collinearity is not a problem for our model. 
 
 
In terms of the correlation coefficients reported in Table (2), the correlation between 
voluntary disclosure and firm size is positive and significant at the 5% level of 
significance (one tailed test) as expected. However, the correlation between 
mandatory disclosure and firm size is negative and significant. Furthermore, the 
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correlation between legal form and voluntary disclosure is significantly negative, 
while it is insignificantly positive with mandatory disclosure. This in turns means that 
while there is no difference between public business sector companies and private 
sector companies in terms of mandatory disclosure, public business sector companies 
disclose less voluntary information than do private sector companies. All the 
correlation coefficients between the other variables and the two measures of 
disclosure are not significant.  
 
The negative and significant correlation between mandatory disclosure and firm size 
on the one hand, and the negative and significant correlation between legal form and 
voluntary disclosure on the other hand, require more detailed examination since they 
are not expected.  
 
We start with the results for legal form. Since all listed companies have to comply 
with disclosure requirements irrespective of their legal form, the first step was to test 
whether there is any difference between public sector companies and private sector 
companies regarding other firm characteristics for example: size, profitability, and 
gearing that could have been captured by our legal form variable. 
 
Therefore, we tested for differences in the mean of each firm characteristic and 
disclosure levels between public business sector companies and private sector 
companies. The results in Table (3) show that there is no significant difference 
between public sector companies and private sector companies regarding firm 
profitability, size, stock activity and mandatory disclosure level. However, public 
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sector companies do tend to have higher gearing ratios than private sector ones and 
tend to disclose less in terms of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 3 is about here 
 
 
We suggest a number of potential explanations for the higher gearing ratios and the 
low voluntary disclosure. First, public sector companies may have a higher gearing 
ratio because they tend to borrow from banks and holding companies that are state-
owned. Both types of lenders should have easy access to information whenever 
required. Moreover, effectively this debt of public sector companies is backed by the 
state. Therefore, it is conceivable that public sector companies might feel under less 
pressure to disclose information to public on a voluntary basis. Second, our panel of 
companies includes thirteen public sector companies that have been privatised and 
changed their legal form to private sector companies. It was decided to treat these 
thirteen companies as “new companies” once they changed their legal status. It is 
possible that these companies, once successfully privatised, were more inclined to 
disclose information than other public sector companies that have not been privatised  
 
Third, public sector companies and private sector companies are effectively 
complying with different sets of regulations, thus potentially creating some room for 
confusion. During our investigation of the annual reports of the sample firms, we 
noted that public business sector companies disclose information according to the 
disclosure requirements of the Uniform Accounting System (UAS) in most cases, 
while private sector companies, where state ownership is less than 51%, disclose 
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information according to the disclosure requirements of the UAS, the Company Law 
(CA) of 1981, and the Capital Market Law (CML) in most cases. Private sector 
companies usually disclose information according to the disclosure requirements of 
the CA or/and the CML.   Given that the list of information disclosure comprising the 
disclosure indexes of this research is primary reflecting the disclosure requirements of 
the CML which in turn has some overlap with the disclosure requirements of the CA 
of 1981; it is not surprising that public business sector companies disclose less 
information than do private sector companies. Moreover, it is worth noting that CMA 
staff was using standard forms for the balance sheet (statement of financial position) 
and profit and loss account (income statement), which are very similar to their 
counterparts according to the Company Law of 1981, to fill in and keep records of 
disclosure information on listed companies. However, it seems that listed companies 
were not obligated to release their annual reports using these forms.  
 
This led us to investigate the difference in financial reporting practice per item of 
information between public business sector companies and private sector companies. 
The results in Appendix (3) present the T-test for equivalence in the mean for each 
item of information according to the legal form of the reporting entity. The disclosure 
index contains 75 items. Of these, 31 items of information reflect no significant 
difference in the mean according to the legal form of the reported company. Of the 
remaining 44 items, the results show that public business sector companies disclose 
more information for 17 items than do the private sector ones, but disclose less for 27 
items of information.  
  
 28 
In terms of mandatory disclosure, public sector companies disclose less in 14 cases 
out of 23, while in terms of voluntary disclosure public sector companies disclose less 
in 13 out of 21.  
A more detailed analysis in Appendix 3 show that  public business sector companies 
disclose more  details regarding some items of information than private sector ones 
such as: classification of other receivables, provisions, long-term liabilities, 
investments in projects under construction, other investments and their market values 
if different from book value, operating income, interest expense, non-operating 
revenues and expenses, financial ratios, foreign exchange gains / losses, composition 
of shareholdings, cash outflow for taxes, number of employees, business segment, 
exports, composition of shareholdings and significant shareholders. However, they 
disclose less regarding the layout of the balance sheet, cash flow statement, notes to 
accounts, policies adopted in preparing the financial statements, and other information 
such as: EPS information, company legal status, purpose of the company’s activity, 
number of issued shares and par value per share and restrictions on ownership of 
assets.  
 
These results provide some support for our hypothesis of lack of a standard form for 
the annual report, which might lead public business sector companies in most cases to 
disclose according to the Uniform Accounting System (UAS) of 1966 rather than to 
disclose according to the Capital Market Law no. 95 of 1992. 
 
To try to explain the negative relationship between firm size measured by ln(assets) 
and mandatory disclosure levels we divided the sample of companies into two groups 
according to their size: larger or smaller than the median asset size. The results, not 
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presented here for reasons of space, show that only for seven out of 49 items of 
mandatory information is there a significant difference in their mean value. Smaller 
firms disclose more information regarding five items: 1.6, 2.3, 2.8, 3.19 and 7.5, while 
large companies disclose more information regarding two items of mandatory 
information: 3.12 and 3.17.  (proofs are right) However, it is possible that the negative 
relationship is due to the disproportionate effect of  very big companies,  
 This prompted us to examine the dataset in the subsequent analysis for outliers, 
defined as observations with large standardized residuals (equal to or more than 3 
standard deviations), and/or observations whose values give them large influence . In 
the following section based on a multivariate analysis we will show results based on a 
sample that includes the outliers and one that excludes them.  However, the removal 
of outliers did not affect the relationship between size and mandatory disclosure. 
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5.3   The multiple regression model 
 
We estimate multiple regression models specified according to the hypotheses 
developed in the previous section for all variables expected to affect disclosure levels.  
 
The general regression model to be estimated is: 
  
Disclosure level = ƒ (firm size, legal form, profitability, gearing, stock activity) 
 
We add a dummy variable for 1997 in the voluntary disclosure model because it is 
shown from the descriptive analysis that the voluntary disclosure level dropped in 
1997. In 1997 Egypt witnessed three major events: a terrorist attack on upper Egypt in 
November 1997, which affected the whole economy for some years; the issuance of 
the Egyptian Accounting Standards by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which should 
facilitate the preparation of mandatory disclosure information; and finally the 
introduction of symmetric price limits (-5% to + 5%) on individual shares on 
February 24, which might be responsible for price distortions on the Stock Exchange. 
While the issuance of the EAS could enhance mandatory disclosures, as more 
guidelines are available, the other two events could give contradictory expectations 
regarding the level of voluntary disclosure. However, we test for a negative effect 
guided by the descriptive analysis. 
 
Multiple regression models are estimated for both types of disclosure level:  voluntary 
and mandatory. The method of estimation used was pooled-generalised least squares 
(GLS), with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 
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Heteroskedasticity is an issue, given that different sizes of companies are included in 
the sample. E-Views software was used to estimate the models. Using the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance option, E-Views 
estimates covariances that are robust to general heteroskedasticity. This panel data 
form of heteroskedasticity is different from pure cross-section heteroskedasticity, 
since variances within a cross-section are allowed to differ over time.  GLS is 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on transformed variables that satisfies the 
standard least-squares assumptions [28, 363]. GLS gives less weight to observations 
with greater variability and more weight to observations with smaller variability, so it 
enables us to estimate the population regression function more accurately. The 
standard OLS method does not follow this strategy and therefore does not make use of 
the “information” contained in the changing variability of the dependent variable [28, 
362].  
 
 
Regression results for both mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels with and 
without outliers are presented in Table (4). With respect to the results without 
excluding the outliers, all the explanatory variables in the mandatory index regression 
are highly significant. The relationship between firm size and mandatory disclosure is 
significantly negative, which confirms the results obtained from the descriptive 
analysis.  Significant negative relationships between both types of disclosure indexes 
and legal form are confirmed at the 1% level of significance. The results for 
profitability are mixed and contradict our hypotheses to some extent. While 
profitability and mandatory disclosure are significantly positively related as expected, 
it has no significant relationship with voluntary disclosure [29].  The results for 
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gearing are significantly positive at the 1% level of significance for mandatory 
disclosure, but negative and not significant for voluntary disclosure. So, while higher 
gearing ratios are motivating companies to comply with mandatory disclosure, they 
do not affect voluntary disclosure. These results for gearing contradict our hypotheses 
with respect to the Egyptian market. 
 
Table 4 is about here 
 
 
The results for share activity are also mixed. While heavily traded companies are 
more likely to comply with mandatory disclosure, they are less likely to disclose 
information voluntarily. The dummy variable is significantly negative, implying that 
the events of 1997 significantly reduced the level of voluntary disclosure    
The adjusted R-squared of each model is very high [30] compared to prior studies. 
The lowest adjusted R-squared obtained was for the voluntary disclosure model 
(0.89), but this is still very high compared with prior studies. However, the high value 
of the adjusted R-squared might not be sufficient to indicate how good the model is. 
Therefore, we also report the standard error of each model [31]. The standard error of 
each regression model is within an acceptable range, although we do not use the 
models for prediction in this paper. 
 
As previously mentioned, as a robustness check of the sensitivity of our results to the 
existence of outliers, we have re-estimated the models after excluding the outliers. 
Then we apply GLS, with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
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covariance to the modified data for each model.  The results are presented in Table 
(4).  
 
 
The results show that dropping the outliers does not affect the relationships between 
both types of disclosure and firm size, legal form, stock activity and the1997 dummy 
in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients, although it does affect the 
magnitude of the coefficients to some extent.  
 
However, dropping the outliers does cause all the profitability coefficients to become 
significant and positive bringing our results in line with with expectations from the 
agency theory and the political process theory. 
Moreover, dropping the outliers completely changes the results for the gearing ratio: 
gearing now has no relationship with mandatory disclosure as previously expected 
with regard to the Egyptian market. However, , gearing ratio  has a significant 
negative relationship with voluntary disclosure, a results that runs against 
expectations derived from agency theory. . Given that highly geared companies are 
public business sector companies, this result confirm our prior expectations that those 
companies might be under less intensive pressure to disclose information voluntarily 
as their debt is mostly from state owned banks and holding companies.  
 
6   Concluding remarks  
 
This paper has investigated the extent of accounting disclosure and its determinants 
for Egyptian non-financial companies listed in the ESE. The importance of this 
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research arises from using longitudinal data sets, which are rarely used in the 
disclosure literature. Moreover, this study investigates the difference between public 
business sector companies and private sector companies in terms of firm 
characteristics and disclosure practice.  
 
Our results generally show gradual increases in disclosure levels for listed non-
financial companies over the period 1995 to 2002. Large companies disclose more 
information in terms of voluntary disclosure, but they disclose less information in 
terms of mandatory disclosure. While the positive effect of firm size upon voluntary 
disclosure level is generally expected, the negative effect of size upon mandatory 
disclosure remains unexplained.  
 
Public business sector companies disclose less information than private sector 
companies whatever the type of disclosure is. One possible explanation  is  that public 
business sector companies disclose information in their annual report in the fulfilment 
of the disclosure requirements of the Uniform Accounting System rather than the 
disclosure requirement of the Capital Market Law, which mainly forms the disclosure 
index of this research. Differences between public business sector companies and 
private sector companies do exist for different types of information. While public 
business sector companies disclose more financial details about some items of the 
balance sheet and income statement, they disclose less regarding the layout of the 
balance sheet, cash flow statement, notes to accounts, policies adopted in preparing 
the financial statements, and general information. These results call for a standard 
format for the annual report to enhance compliance with mandatory disclosure 
according to CML. 
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Moreover, more profitable companies disclose more information than do less 
profitable ones. . The gearing ratio was found to decrease the level of voluntary 
disclosure, with no effect upon mandatory disclosure. Furthermore, while stock 
activity enhances compliance with mandatory disclosure, it makes companies more 
reluctant to disclose information voluntarily.  
 
A potential limitation of studies using disclosure indices to investigate disclosure 
levels is that the results are only valid to the extent of the disclosure index used and 
time period investigated. The selection of the items included in the disclosure index, 
and the classification into mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices, inevitably 
involved some degree of judgement and subjectivity. Although we have tried to 
diminish subjectivity it cannot be removed entirely [5]. Also, due to missing data we 
were unable to test for fixed effects. Another limitation is that the research sample is 
not randomly selected. This is due to the difficulty of gathering data in an emerging 
country; hence availability of data limits our ability to select a random sample.  
 
Future research could investigate the impact of new regulations upon the level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure, as compliance costs will increase. Also future 
research might investigate the impact of other potential explanatory variables such as 
ownership structure and board composition, which are proxies for corporate 
governance, upon the level of disclosure. More research could be carried out to 
investigate disclosure levels using dynamic models. A comparative study of 
disclosure practice for different countries in the region complying with IFRS might 
also be fruitful.  
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Graph 1   Disclosure indices 
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Table 1   Descriptive analysis – common samples 
Gearing: total debt/ total assets; profitability: net income/book value of equity; stock activity:  share 
trading days for six months after the financial year-end divided by total trading days.  
 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis 
Mandatory disclosure 0.898 0.938 1 0.438 -1.826 6.576 
Voluntary disclosure 0.48 0.52 0.846 0 -0.468 2.425 
Sales (LE) m 323 180  2300 4 2.738 12.324 
Ln (Sales) 19.038 19.008 21.556 15.237 -0.49 3.259 
Assets (LE) m 572 295 5990 18 3.725 21.175 
Ln (Assets) 19.585 19.502 22.513 16.7 0.127 2.975 
Gearing 0.584 0.588 0.947 0 -0.283 2.632 
Profitability 0.281 0.26 1.399 -0.91 0.702 9.257 
Stock activity 0.818 0.941 1 0.188 -1.16 3.014 
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Graph 2   Median disclosure levels over eight years 
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Table 2    Spearman’s correlation coefficients  
MINDEX: mandatory disclosure level; VINDEX: voluntary disclosure level. 
 
 
 
MINDEX VINDEX Size Legal 
form 
Profitability Gearing 
VINDEX 0.554**      
 (0.000)      
Size:  -0.121* 0.102     
 (0.047) (0.092)     
Legal form 0.006 -0.265** 0.036    
 (0.921) (0.000) (0.513)    
Profitability 0.064 0.007 0.081 0.019   
 (0.299) (0.904) (0.138) (0.729)   
Gearing 0.020 -0.029 0.118* 0.100 0.189**  
 (0.748) (0.636) (0.027) (0.067) (0.000)  
Stock activity -0.001 -0.084 0.307** -0.082 0.152* 0.079 
 (0.984) (0.167) (0.000) (0.176) (0.013) (0.193) 
Numbers in parentheses are probabilities of significance. ** Significant at 1% level (2-tailed).  
* Significant at 5% level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3    T-test for equality of means 
 
Public sector  
 
Private sector  T-test 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
N Mean P. (2-tailed) 
 
Mandatory disclosure 123 0.895 149 0.899 0.763 
Voluntary disclosure 123 0.428 149 0.526 0.000 
Size  162 19.711 174 19.532 0.117 
Profitability 162 0.270 164 0.277 0.816 
Gearing 162 0.611 174 0.565 0.030 
Stock activity 123 0.825 149 0.815 0.714 
The number of total observations per variable might be different among different variables than the 
total observations in the final sample (272 observations) due to the inclusion of comparable figures in 
previous years. 
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Table 4    Multiple regression models 
Dependent variables:  voluntary and mandatory disclosure indices 
Sample size: 77 companies for the period 1995- 2002 
Firm size: natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; legal form: a dummy variable taking the 
value of one if the company is a public sector company and the value of zero otherwise; profitability: 
net income/book value of equity; gearing: total debt/ total assets; stock activity:  share’s trading days 
for six months after the financial year-end divided by total trading days; d1997: a dummy variable for 
year 1997. The number of observations decreases after eliminating outliers, defined as those 
observations with large standardized residuals (equal to or more than 3), or observations whose 
leverage values give them large influence. These outliers have been identified for each model 
individually; hence the number of observations in each model after dropping the outliers is different. 
 
Variable name Models before dropping the 
outliers 
Models after dropping the 
outliers 
Voluntary 
index 
Mandatory 
index 
 
Voluntary 
index 
Mandatory 
index 
 
Constant  0.002 
(0.023) 
1.107** 
(59.437) 
-0.040 
(-0.522) 
1.018** 
(27.828) 
Size 0.032** 
(8.331) 
-0.013** 
(-12.922) 
0.034** 
(8.432) 
-0.007** 
(-3.370) 
Legal form -0.105** 
(-10.159) 
-0.013** 
(-5.411) 
-0.107** 
(-10.482) 
-0.008* 
(-2.445) 
Profitability  0.004 
(0.110) 
0.039** 
(6.852) 
0.107** 
(3.484) 
0.057** 
(4.787) 
Gearing  -0.025 
(-1.064) 
0.051** 
(9.984) 
-0.072** 
(-3.484) 
0.013 
(1.496) 
Stock activity -0.073** 
(-3.631) 
0.020** 
(4.139) 
-0.067** 
(-2.951) 
0.018** 
(2.719) 
D1997 -0.061** 
(3.677) 
 -0.085** 
(-5.318) 
 
2R   0.886 0.998 0.863 0.993 
S.E. of regression 0.183 0.101 0.182 0.072 
Observations 264 264 257 244 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and 
GLS (cross-section weights). ** Significant at 1% level .  * Significant at 5% level  
 
Appendix (1) 
Rarely or never disclosed items 
 
Group A: general information 
1.9 Market share.      
1.10 Geographic segment.   
1.13 Future plans.       
 
Group B: income statement  
2.10 Non-operating gains or losses.      
2.14 Minority interests.    
2.16 Effect of significant changes in 
accounting estimates.      
2.17 Fundamental errors and how they are 
treated.      
2.18 Effect of significant changes in 
accounting  
 
Group C: balance sheet  
3.18 Classification of loans.      
3.22 Changes in equity accounts during the 
year.      
3.23 Priorities to preferred shares as to 
dividends.      
3.24 Accumulated preferred dividends due.      
3.25 Number and cost of treasury stock      
3.26 Paid in capital in excess of par value  
   
Group D: cash flow statement      
4.1 Operating activities disclosed according to 
direct/indirect method.      
4.8 Cash flow related to purchase/sale of 
interest in holding subsidiary and associated 
companies.      
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4.11 Balances of cash & cash equivalents that 
are not available for use.      
4.12 Amount of facilities available for the 
company but not used yet.      
4.13 Cash flow representing increase in 
operating capacity disclosed separately from 
that representing maintenance of current 
operating capacity.      
4.14 Disclosing the necessary reconciliation if 
the balances appearing in the cash flow 
statement are different from the corresponding 
balances appearing in the balance sheet.      
 
 Group E: accounting policies  
5.3 Research & development costs.      
5.4 Pension costs.      
5.5 Reasons for extraordinary items.  
5.7 Acquisition method.      
5.8 Treatment of intangible assets.      
5.10 Outside manager of pension funds.      
5.13 Discretionary reserves.      
5.14 Minority interest.      
5.15 Contingent liabilities.   
5.18 Long-term contracts long-term leases 
capital leases sales on instalments and related 
interest.      
5.19 Events after the balance sheet date.      
5.20 The policy used for determination of cash 
& cash equivalents.   
    
Group F: stockholders information  
6.5 Stock split / dividend / right issues.      
6.6 Stock prices.      
6.7 Trading volumes.      
6.8 Diluted earnings per share.   
     
Group G: supplementary information  
7.4 Disclosure of subsequent events.      
7.8 Qualitative and quantitative forecasts of 
revenues expenses profits and cash flows.      
7.9 Assumptions underlying forecasts.      
7.10 Schedule of interest and principal due on 
long-term debt in future years.      
 
 
Appendix (2) 
List of items of information1 
Group A: general information 
1.1 Company name.      
1.2 Address, telephone, fax.      
1.3 The currency used for the preparation of 
financial statements.      
1.4 Company legal status.  
1.5 Purpose of the company’s activity.      
1.6 The period covered by financial statement      
                                        
1 Underlined items of information are items 
that are treated as voluntary, the rest are 
mandatory. Highlighted items of information 
are items drawn from CIFAR checklist. 
1.7 List of board members and their 
affiliations.      
1.8 Number of employees.      
1.11 Business segment.      
1.12 Comparative financial statements 
1.14 Board of directors’ report.   
    
Group B: income statement  
2.1 Sales or turnover      
2.2 Credit interest.      
2.3 Non-operating revenues.      
2.4 Cost of good sold.      
2.5 Selling general and administrative 
expenses.      
2.6 Operating income.      
2.7 Interest expense.      
2.8 Income tax expense.      
2.9 Non-operating expenses 
2.11 Foreign exchange gains or losses.      
2.12 Depreciation & amortization expenses.      
2.13 Net income.      
2.15 Effect of transactions with related parties: 
holding, subsidiary, and associated companies 
 
Group C: balance sheet  
3.1 Classification of assets to long-term assets 
and current assets.      
3.2 Classification of liabilities to long-term 
liabilities and short-term liabilities.    
3.3 Owners’ equity separated from liabilities.      
3.4 Separation of reserves and retained 
earnings.      
3.5 Cash and cash equivalents.      
3.6 Inventories reported.      
3.7 Accounts receivables.      
3.8 Classification of other receivables.      
3.9 Investment in each subsidiary & associated 
company.      
3.10 Other investments and their market values 
if different from book value.      
3.11 Items and values of intangible assets.      
3.12 Investments in projects under 
construction.      
3.13 The value of each item of fixed assets and 
its accumulated depreciation.       
3.14 Total assets can be derived.      
3.15 Restrictions on ownership of assets.      
3.16 Classification of short-term liabilities.      
3.17 Classification of long-term liabilities.   
3.19 Classification of provisions      
3.20 Number of issued shares and par value 
per share.      
3.21 The paid amount of capital.      
3.27 Classification of reserves.       
3.28 Retained earnings.      
 
Group D: cash flow statement 
4.2 Disclosing the necessary reconciliation of 
net income when the indirect method is used.      
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4.3 Main items of cash inflow from different 
activities.      
4.4 Main items of cash outflow from different 
activities.       
4.5 Net cash flow from different activities.       
4.6 Cash flow related to interests, dividends, 
and extraordinary items disclosed separately.      
4.7 Cash outflow for taxes.      
 4.9 Non-cash investment and finance 
transactions disclosed separately.       
4.10 Breakdown of cash & cash equivalents.   
 
Group E: accounting policies  
5.1 Accounting standards.      
5.2 Financial statements cost basis.      
5.6 Inventory physical count & valuation.      
5.9 Taxation.      
5.11 Foreign currency transaction method.      
5.12 Foreign currency transaction gains or 
losses.      
5.16 Treatment of investments.      
5.17 Revenue recognition basis.      
 
Group F: stockholders information  
6.1 Earnings distribution statement.      
6.2 Earnings per share      
6.3 Total dividends.      
6.4 Dividends per share.      
6.9 Composition of shareholdings.      
6.10 Significant shareholders.      
 
Group G: supplementary information  
7.1 Earning per share numerator.      
7.2 Earnings per share denominator.      
7.3 Notes to accounts.    
7.5 Remuneration of board of directors.  
7.6 Exports.       
7.7 Financial ratios disclosed.   
7.11 Auditor’s report.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3      T- test for equality of means per item of information 
Item of information  
 
 
Mandatory items of information 
Public sector  
 
Private sector  T-test 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
N Mean P. (2-tailed) 
 
1.4 Company legal status.  123 0.870 149 0.946 0.027 
1.5 Purpose of the company’s activity.      123 0.764 149 0.886 0.008 
2.3 Non-operating revenues.      123 0.992 143 0.706 0.000 
2.6 Operating income.      123 0.967 141 0.837 0.000 
2.7 Interest expense.      122 0.943 141 0.844 0.011 
2.9 Non-operating expenses.      123 0.984 141 0.709 0.000 
3.1 classifications of assets to long-term assets and current assets. 123 0.854 149 0.993 0.000 
3.2 classification of liabilities to short-term and long-term liabilities  123 0.870 149 0.993 0.000 
3.3 Owners’ equity separated from liabilities.      123 0.967 149 1.000 0.027 
3.8 Classification of other receivables  123 0.984 147 0.932 0.040 
3.10 Other investments and their market values if different from book value.      123 0.951 149 0.826 0.001 
3.12 Investments in projects under construction.      123 0.984 149 0.872 0.001 
3.13 The value of each item of fixed assets and its accumulated depreciation.       123 0.724 149 0.893 0.000 
3.16 Classification of short-term liabilities.      123 0.951 149 0.987 0.086 
3.17 Classification of long-term liabilities.    123 0.870 149 0.785 0.069 
3.19 Classification of provisions  123 0.943 149 0.799 0.000 
3.20 Number of issued shares and par value per share.      123 0.805 149 0.899 0.027 
3.28 Retained earnings.      123 0.732 141 0.837 0.037 
4.3 Main items of cash inflow from different activities.      123 0.732 149 0.826 0.062 
4.4 Main items of cash outflow from different activities.       123 0.732 149 0.826 0.062 
4.5 Net cash flow from different activities.       123 0.683 149 0.872 0.000 
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5.6 Inventory physical count & valuation.      123 0.764 147 0.878 0.014 
7.3 Notes to accounts.      123 0.683 149 0.906 0.000 
Voluntary items of information      
1.3 The currency used for the preparation of financial statements.      123 0.463 149 0.685 0.000 
1.8 Number of employees.      123 0.650 149 0.483 0.006 
1.11 Business segment.      123 0.528 146 0.390 0.023 
2.11 Foreign exchange gains/ losses.      123 0.740 141 0.539 0.001 
2.15 Effect of transactions with holding/ subsidiary/ associated companies.      41 0.073 84 0.619 0.000 
3.15 Restrictions on ownership of assets.      123 0.106 149 0.295 0.000 
4.2 Disclosing the necessary reconciliation of net income when the indirect method is 
used.      123 0.252 149 0.490 0.000 
4.7 Cash outflow for taxes.      123 0.683 149 0.490 0.001 
5.2 Financial statements cost basis.      123 0.407 149 0.752 0.000 
5.9 Taxation.      118 0.203 147 0.442 0.000 
5.11 Foreign currency transaction method.      123 0.520 149 0.725 0.000 
5.12 Foreign currency transaction gains/.losses.      123 0.285 149 0.611 0.000 
5.16 Treatment of investments.      123 0.407 149 0.644 0.000 
5.17 Revenue recognition basis.      123 0.049 146 0.582 0.000 
6.2 Earnings per share  123 0.081 141 0.496 0.000 
6.9 Composition of shareholdings.      123 0.642 149 0.530 0.063 
6.10 Significant shareholders.      123 0.634 149 0.530 0.085 
7.1 Earning per share numerator.      123 0.033 141 0.418 0.000 
7.2 Earnings per share denominator.      123 0.033 141 0.411 0.000 
7.6 Exports.       123 0.504 141 0.312 0.001 
7.7 Financial ratios disclosed.       123 0.780 149 0.544 0.000 
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